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Erica Fudge asks if and how, a biography of an animal might be written.
HY ARE THERE NO entries for
animals in the Oxford Dictio-
H i S nary of National Biograplhy
(DNB)? Clearly, an animal's life can
be recorded; but the concept of biog-
raphy has always been applied
uniquely to humans: the life hinted at
in the word biography somehow
refers only to Homo sapiens. Why?
There is a simple answer: anthro-
pocentrism or the belief in the cen-
trality and superiority of human
beings. But this may be too simple.
Perhaps, to write a 'life' is notjust to
present a series of 'facts' but to bear
witness to that individual's potential
to construct a life-story of him- or
herself; to communicate through
language the subject's own self-
understanding (or misunderstand-
ing). In these terms, the subject of
biography is always potentially the
subject of autobiography. But before
making so large a leap, it might be
worth thinking about the other ways
in which animals are always to be
denied access to the DNB.
The brief to contributors to the
Oxford DNB requires 'standard factu-
al components' that must appear in
each entry. These would appear to
allow for some animal 'lives'. I am
going to attempt to write entries for
a couple of animals, both of whom
lived in England in the late sixteenth
A muzzled brown bear is baited by dogs,
from the fourteenth-century Luttrell
Psalter.
and early seventeenth centuries. I do
so not only with the hope of high-
lighting that recording such ani-
mals' lives may be possible, but more
importantly with the hope of bring-
ing to the surface some of the
assumptions that underlie the
creation of the human 'life'. Tracing
the roots of these assumptions takes
us back to the same Early Modern
period: to Rene Descartes' statement
'I think therefore I am', and to his
assertion of the human as a uniquely
and essentially thinking being.
The first 'standard factual compo-
nent' of the DNB 'life' is the obvious
one, the one that organises the
whole reference work: 'Name'. This
is available for some animals, at least:
we know, for example, that one of
the bears at London's Hope Theatre
in the 1650s was called Blind Bess.
According to theatre historian Leslie
Hotson, she was one of 'the most
famous' bears of the age. This Bess
may even have had a family name:
she may have been the bear referred
to as 'Besse Hill' byJohn Taylor the
Water Poet in 1638. (The life
expectancy of a brown bear is now
twenty-five years, though I imagine
that the torture of the bear in the
Hope Theatre may have shortened
her life expectancy somewhat. Zoo
bears have been known to live for up
to fifty years but it seems unlikely
that Bess would have lived that
long.)
A second DNB category: 'Full
dates of birth (or, as a
second best, D
baptism), death, and burial, or
floruit dates' is more difficult for ani-
mals (although exact dates can also
be difficult for many humans in the
past). In the case of Bess, we may not
be able to offer a date of birth, and
certainly will not find baptismal
records; but we do have a date for
her death: February 9th, 1656, when
she was shot, according to the diarist
Henry Townshend, by Colonel
Pride's men.
Other of the personal details may
be less relevant for the non-human:
'Title' becomes redundant (al-
though the apocryphal story of the
royal cut of meat dubbed 'Sir Loin of
Beef' might suggest the possibility of
a biography of meat: giving the truly
dead a life, you might say). 'Physical
appearance, character traits': for
Bess we have no documentary evi-
dence, but we might guess: brown,
hairy, clawless, toothless, scarred,
blinded, probably angry, aggressive,
but maybe terrified. 'Places of birth
(or, as a second best, baptism),
death, and burial': we cannot name
the place of birth (though Russia is a
possibility) but know that she died in
Southwark. 'Place of settled resi-
dence' we can offer - if settled is the
right word for a bear's accommoda-
tion behind the Hope Theatre.
'Cause of death' is sim-
ple: execution by
firing squad.
There are the .
bare bones of a 'life' here, a 'life'
that is representable in the form of
an albeit brief DNB entry. There is
even a contemporary epitaph from a
1660 text entitled Tlhe Man in the
Moon:
Here lyes old Bess the ransome of
Prides fury.
Who was condemn'd without ajudge
orJury.
A valiant Champion was she, many
prize
Gainst Butchers Dogs she won, till
that her eyes
She lost in service ...
But even where sufficient detail of
the animal's life is known, its entry
into biographical record remains
unlikely. Another example will make
the point: Morocco the Intelligent
Horse, who was a celebrity for over
twenty years from 1588, and was
referred to by, among others, Shake-
speare,Jonson, Nashe, Dekker, and
Markham. This horse could, accord-
ing to these records, count the spots
on dice, dance, pick a virgin from a
whore and an Englishman from a
Spaniard. But even Morocco, howev-
er, gets no entry in the DNB. The
entry is given instead to his owner,
Banks, a man with no recorded first
name and dates (fl.1588-1637) that
reflect not his birth, baptism, death
or burial, but references to him as
the owner of the performing horse
(though the longevity of Morocco's
career may point to the fact that
more than one horse performed the
tricks under the name). His entry in
the old DNB, by Sidney Lee, brings
together the numerous reports of
the horse not the man in order to
create the human subject's 'life'. The
animal is the showstopper, the real
celebrity, but for the biographer he
is the object, not the subject, of the
dictionary entry.
The reason for Morocco and
Bess's exclusion becomes clear in the
next twvo categories of the DNB 'life'.
'ramily data' asks for full names and
details of father, mother, spouse and
so on. This is not possible for either
Bess or Morocco. But even if such
A woodcut of Morocco the Intelligent
Horse with his owner Banks, performing
arithmetic tricks in Elizabethan London
(1595).
information did exist it would not
give more reason to include the ani-
mal in the DNB. Where full details of
an animal's lineage are recorded - in
the stud books that were so central
to the horse-breeding industry in the
eighteenth century and after, for
example - that lineage is recorded
not to place the animal as an individ-
ual in a family tree so much as in a
bloodline. The thoroughbred re-
mains the object of human breeding
expertise, but it does not become the
subject of a biography even though
this vital information about the ani-
mal is recorded. And even when pic-
tures of these thoroughbreds exist -
as so many do - there is a question
over their meaning. Are images of
thoroughbred horses really 'por-
traits' or are they merely representa-
tions of expensive human posses-
sions? The National Portrait Gallery,
founded in 1856 to 'collect the like-
nesses of famous British men and
women', includes footballer David
Beckham, for example, but not the
equally celebrated racehorses Nij-
inski or Red Rum. In a similar way
the genetic material and medical his-
tory of Dolly the Sheep (1996-2003)
The bear- and bull-baiting arenas in
Southwark; a detail from Agas' Civitas
Londinium (dating from the second half
of the 16th century).
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have been recorded in exceptional
detail, but even they do not offer
'Family data' in the way expected by
the DNB. The data mark the record-
ing of a scientific breakthrough, in
which Dolly is merely the object of
observation and not an actor in her
own life.
But it is when confronted with the
DNB's next category, 'Career', that
things get really difficult for the
potential animal bi6grapher. The
discourse of biography, as set out in
the DNB, allows for the recording of
only the most extraordinary - possi-
bly unnatural - of animals: those
with occupations. For Bess a career
trajectory for a DNB entry might be
written in the following terms: 'bait-
ed bear then, sometime between
1638 and 1656, promotion(?) to
blind bear (ajob with specifications
that included being beaten with
whips perhaps weekly on a Thursday
by members of the public)'. Like-
wise, we know that Morocco began
performing his tricks in London in
1588; in September 1591 he was re-
corded giving shows in the pro-
vinces. In 1601, according to Owles
Almanacke (1618), he climbed onto
the roof of St Paul's Cathedral; the
following year he is reported to have
performed in France, and in 1609
one text records his appearance in
Frankfurt. These achievements are
ascribed to his owner in the old DNB.
The designation of Morocco's star
to his owner, and the exclusion of
Bess from the DNB altogether, is
based upon our understanding of
the concept of a career. A career is
something that we fashion for our-
selves; that we work at with a sense of
commitment. It is self-willed. This is
why the most thorough animal 'lives'
available to us are not factual but fic-
tional ones - Anna Sewell's Black
Beauty or Virginia Woolf's Flush, for
example. In fiction an author can
speculate about the animal's inter-
pretation of events: can dramatise
Black Beauty's understanding of his
transfer from one human to another,
or detail the spaniel Flush's experi-
ence of Elizabeth Barrett's courtship
by Robert Browning. Because a real
animal leaves us no comprehensible
record of its thoughts and experi-
ences, desires and intentions, it is
impossible for us to write a factual
biography in the same way. Animals'
thoughts and intentions are
unrecordable, and because of this
humans have historically asserted
that they lack thoughts and inten-
tions; self-awareness and self-will. In
short, they have no career.
And so, even though Bess may
have had something that might be
represented as looking like a career,
we should not call it one, as we can-
not attribute any volition to her
being sent into the bear pit to be
beaten with whips. Likewise, even
though Morocco had at least one
European tour, he did not master-
mind his own rise to fame. Banks,
who presumably did, therefore gets
the DNB entry. Other animals may
appear to have an occupation, yet
fall even further outside of criteria of
the career. Being a rat-catcher is an
occupation for a dog, and so is being
a pet. Both activities serve functions,
and the pet may get an individual
name and perhaps even a portrait.
On the other hand, being a fox
might involve being an annoyance to
a farmer, but it is neither an occupa-
tion nor a career. It is a state of
being: it is natural, and the element
of volition is relegated to one of
mere instinct. 'Instinct' is not a 'stan-
dard factual component' of the DNB.
With the assumption of volition
underpinning one of the key cate-
gories of the biography entry, we
may be discovering that the DNB, in
both old and new versions, is follow-
ing in the footsteps of one of the
most influential studies of human
selfhood of the nineteenth century,
Jacob Burckhardt's The Civilisation of
the Renaissance in Italy (1860). Burck-
hardt famously claimed that the Mid-
dle Ages were a time when 'Man was
conscious of himself only as member
of a race, people, party, family, or
corporation - only through some
general category.' That it was only 'at
the close of the thirteenth century
[that] Italy began to swarm with indi-
viduality.' Tony Davies has noted that
Burckhardt read into the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries 'a new and
distinctively modern notion of
human individuality ... demonstrably
shaped by and inseparable from
nineteenth-century conditions and
concerns.'
Burckhardt may have exemplified
the liberal humanist position that
proclaims the autonomy of the indi-
'Monkeys and Dogs Playing' (1661) by
Francis Barlow, the earliest British-born
animal painter. The dogs may be
portraits of particular animals.
vidual but it did not originate with
him. It is also found in Thomas Jef-
ferson's American Declaration of
Independence (1776) and Tom
Paine's Rights of Man (1792). But the
inscription of the human subject and
construction of the self - and the
absence of animals - in the discourse
of the 'life' is somewhat older than
this. The assertion of human individ-
uality that lies at the heart of the
modern biographical enterprise
emerges fully in the mid-seventeenth
century, in Ren6 Descartes' work on
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Faithful friend: from a memorial in
Westmninster Abbey to Edward Talbot,
Earl of Shrevsbury (1561-1618).
'bio' but does not attempt to merely
-- _ I write the biographies of animals to
make up for past absence. Instead it
I questions altogether the potential to
write anyone or anything's 'life'. It
questions, in fact, the nature of the
'life' altogether.
This tradition arguably derived
from Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of
SCepticiSM Of c.AD 200. Philosopher
Jonathan Bares argues that this text
saw a key shift within the Western
philosophical tradition from meta-
physics to epistemology; and in it
Sextus set out some of the key
assumptions of scepticism. He identi-
fied three schools of thought in
ancient philosophy: 'Iot]hose who are
animal automatism and human indi-
viduality, autonomy and historical
transcendence. He wrote in Discourse
on the Method (1 637):
I knew I wvas a substance wvhose wvhole
essence or nature is simply to think,
and which does not require any place,
or depend on any material thing, in
order to exist. Accordingly this TI -
that is, the soul by which I am what I
am - is entirely distinct from the
body, and indeed is easier to know
than the body, and wvould not fail to
be wvhatever it is, even if the body did 'IC
not exist.
Descartes' assertion of this essen-
tially human separation of body and
mind - which lies at the heart of the
liberal humanist tradition that suf- 
--
fuses the DNB - did not exist in iso-
lation, however. For historian of
ideas George Boas, Descartes wvas
reacting in part to writings that chal- ~
lenged such separation. Where the
libemal humanist tradition that lies at '
the heart of the both the old and the Z
newv DNB may be traceable back to
Descartes, a sceptical tradition can
be read as both a prompt to Cartes-
ianism and a true alternative to the
humanism of the biography. This
alternative tradition of biography
takes a fuller note of the meaning of
Anne of Demnmark with her dogs and 
--
hor-se, painted by Paul von Somer in
1617.
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William Hogartli was an animal lover
who included this detail of a cat and
goldfinch in The Graham Children (1742).
called Dogmatists ... think they have
discovered the truth; ... [the] Aca-
demics ... have asserted that things
cannot be apprehended; and the
Sceptics are still investigating.' The
notion that a 'life' can be written
relies upon a dogmatic belief in
truth, in the facts being available to
the researcher. A sceptical biogra-
pher might find writing such a 'life',
more difficult.
Sextus's dismissal of dogmatism
centred on the status of humans and
animals. He countered the claims of
the dogmatic philosophers by taking
up and dismissing distinct dogmatic
proposals. One example will suffice:
Democritus says that a human being
is what we all know. But as far as this
goes, we shall not be acquainted wvith
humans; for we also know dogs - and
for that reason dogs will be humans.
And there are some humans we do
not know - so they will not be
humans. Or rather, as far as this
conception goes, no-one will be a
human; for if human is known by all
humans, then no-one will be a human
according to him. That this point is
not sophistical but in line wvith his
own views is apparenL
Exploring the dogmatics' beliefs
in the existence of a distinct being
called a human, Sextus proposed a
logical end to logic. He wrote:
But even if we grant that humans are
apprehended, it is surely not possible
to show that it is by humans that
objects must bejudged. For anyone
who says that objects should be
judged by humans wvill say this either
*vithout proof or wvith proof. Not wvith
proof; for the proof must be true and
must have been judged - and so have
been judged by something. Now since
we cannot say on the basis of agree-
ment by what the proof itself can be
judged (for we are investigating the
standard by which), we shall not be
able to decide the proof; and for this
reason we shall not be able to prove
the standard, with which our account
is now concerned. But if it is said
wvithout proof that it is by humans
that objects must bejudged, this wvill
be unconvincing. Thus we shall not
be able to affirm that humans are the
standard by which.
Pierre Charron put this slightly
differently in 1601 when he asked a
fundamental question about the
need to perform a comparison of
humans and animals:
But who shall doe it? Shall man? He is
a partie and to be suspected; and to
say the truth, deales partially therein.
By implication, it is unsurprising that
orthodox evaluations of humans and
animals always assert the superiority
of the human - it is, after all, always
humans who are performing the
evaluation.
This emphasis on animals remains
central in Early Modern sceptics'
questioning of human superiority. In
the late sixteenth century, for exam-
ple, Charron's friend and mentor
Michel de Montaigne wondered
about the subjectivity of his cat:
'When I play with my cat, how do I
know that she is not passing time
with me rather than I with her?' In
the English text, Sceptickc, Or Specula-
tions (c.1590), attributed to Walter
Ralegh when it was first published in
1651, we read:
For why should I presume to prefer
my conceit and imagination, in
affirming that a thing is thus, or thus,
in its own nature, because it seemeth
to me to be so, before the conceit of
other living creatures, who may as
well think it to be othenvise in each
one nature, because it appeareth
othenvise to them than it doth to me?
The author goes on to argue that
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animals 'may be in the truth and I in
error, as well as I in truth, and they
err. If my conceit must be believed
before theirs, great reason that it be
proved to be truer than theirs.' All
such statements derive ultimately
from Sextus Empiricus, whose text
was first printed in Latin by Henri
Estienne in 1562.
All these writers discovered no
foundation from which to judge
truth from falsehood, and retired to
what Barnes called 'suspension of
judgment'. They commonly found
that wonder, a turbulence of the
mind, ceases, and peace reigns.
Unable to prove the standard, the
standards disappear. Applying this to
the biography, name, dates, family
data and career are all shown to be
constructed in order to make the
human itself.
If we apply the same sceptical state
of mind to the assumption of the
fox's lack of career, the animal's pos-
session of mere instinct and the
human self-conceit of its agency, we
can begin, not to write the lives of
animals - that would maintain the
assumptions of biography - but to
rethink the construction of the 'life'
of humans. Where biographical writ-
ings like the DNB claim the existence
of an individual, and therefore of a
'life', a sceptical view would hold up
animals as an example of the limits
of human knowledge - as the point
at which our capacity as thinking
beings breaks down. It would also
argue that human individuality does
not exist prior to writing, but is actu-
ally being created in the writing of
the 'life'; and, further, that the exclu-
sion of animals from such 'life' is
fundamental to that creation.
Descartes, of course, found a
more dogmatic way to answer these
sceptics, even though he began his
search with absolute doubt 'I cannot
share the opinion of Montaigne and
others who attribute understanding
or thought to animals', he wrote in a
1646 letter to William Cavendish:
I am not worried that people say that
human beings have absolute
dominion over all the other animals;
for I agree that some of them are
stronger than us, and I believe that
there may also be some animals
which have a natural cunning capable
of deceiving the shrewvdest human
beings. But I consider that they
imitate or surpass us only in those of
our actions wvhich are not guided by
our thought.
Unwilling to the end, animals lack the
crucial element for a 'life'.
In this sense, the exclusion of ani-
mals from the DNB does not just
mark the continuing anthropocen-
trism of history as a discipline.
Rather it marks out the continuation
of a version of human selfhood that
is, and always has been, constructed
out of, in exclusion from, and by the
naming of animals. The DNB, in fact,
seems to reverse what is often regard-
ed as the original vision of dominion
but in fact it has the same effect.
Where Adam names the beasts in
Genesis 2: 19-20 and so enacts his
power over them, contemporary his-
torians, by failing to give names to
animals, also render them powerless
Montaigne asked, 'What can any-
one understand who cannot under-
stand himself?'. His question empha-
sises the importance of the desire to
'write' the 'life' of oneself and conse-
quently of others. But to those, like
Montaigne, in the sceptical tradition,
the inevitable failure of ihuman
understanding means that this is
impossible, even if we are unwilling
to admit it. Philosophers, Montaigne
wrote, 'do not want to make an
express avowal of the ignorance and
weakness of human reason - they
want to avoid frightening the chil-
dren'. A modern sceptic might add
that historians do not want to make
an express avowal of the underlying
philosophical violence of the human
'life' because they want to avoid
frightening their readers into recog-
nising the links betwveen scholarship
and the slaughterhouse.
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PELORUS JACK (fl. 1888-1912)
A Risso's DOLPHIN which, between 1888
and 1912, accompanied any steamer trav-
elling outside Admiralty Bay and Pelorus
Sound in New Zealand's Cook Strait.This
dangerous channel is full of rocks, has
strong currents and has been the site of
hundreds of shipwrecks. But none
occurred when Pelorus Jack was at
work.There is no telling how many lives
he saved. If he heard a boat's motor he
would swim with it for twenty minutes
or more, guiding it through the danger-
ous passage. He particularly liked steam-
ers and quickly became famous, was seen
by thousands of travellers, described
widely in newspapers and shown on
postcards. In 1904 a law was passed to
protect him after a drunk tried to shoot
him from a passing steamer, the Penguin.
It is said that the only ship he never
helped again was the Penguin, which was
later shipwrecked with great loss of life.
He was last seen in April 1912 and
rumours surrounded his disappearance,
including that he had been harpooned by
foreign whalers. However, recent
research has shown that Pelorus Jack
was an old animal who may have died
from natural causes. His head was white
and his body pale, both indications of
age.The Risso's dolphin is a rare species
in New Zealand waters, and it is possible
he swam alongside ships for company in
the absence of his own kind.
Pelorus Jack In the ILN, December 1910.
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